# ADAPTIVE SECURITY PROTOCOLS FOR CPS (CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS) UNDER DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS

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## ABSTRACT-:

The Internet of Things (IoT) has grown in popularity in recent years as a result of its numerous advantages, including time savings, low cost, increased human comfort, and efficient use of electricity. Cyber Physical systems (CPS) are ubiquitous concept in which objects are connected to the internet and equipped with ability to sense and transmit data over a network. Consider a smart home application that makes use of CPS devices. In smart home environments, there are various low-capacity devices (microcontrollers and sensors) connected through wireless networks. The smart devices (SDs) in the network must communicate with adequate security. Due to resource constraints like low processing power and low space, there is a lack of standard security mechanism which can provide adequate security. This research work introduces a novel key establishment mechanism with a lightweight Security algorithm for smart home systems. Proposed mechanism provides solution against various cyber-attacks like replay, masquerade, denial of service, eavesdropping etc. We demonstrate the feasibility of proposed mechanism using proof of concept and evaluate results for showing the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.


*Keywords*-: Internet of Things, Cyber Physical systems, lightweight security, Smart Home Networks, Network Security

## I. INTRODUCTION

Cyber Physical systems CPS is an active system that transforms a physical system into a computerized system through the use of technology and a set of instructions that govern how the system operates. CPS opportunities abound in the global market, as all major nations work on IoT-based projects to improve people's lives and enhance their quality of life. Because of CPS, even the most basic of equipment can function as a smart device. Nowadays, along with the advancement in the field of information technology, communication and electronics, there is a tremendous increase in the use and development of a smart home system (SHS). A smart home refers to a convenient home setup where appliances and devices can be automatically controlled remotely from anywhere with an internet connection using a mobile or other networked device. Devices in a smart home are interconnected through the internet, allowing the user to control functions such as security access to the home, temperature, lighting, and a home theater remotely.

SHSs exhibit various types of advance intelligence, leading to home automation systems, increasing comfort, reduction in operational costs and enhanced safety. There is
 an enormous business and research potential in smart appliances of smart home environments for elderly people, providing them an independent life. SHEs can also be used to provide help remotely in case of any emergencies. Recently there are a lot of research projects initiated for developing smart homes example SM4ALL (Smart Home for all) [2], HOPE (smart home for elderly people) [1], etc.

In a smart home application, there are heterogeneous smart devices like sensors, actuators, smart lights, smart windows, smart speakers, thermostats, doorbells, or home hubs, smart lights, smart fans and many other types of devices as shown in fig. 1. By bringing together a variety of heterogeneous and technical components from various sources, CPS applications connect the physical and virtual worlds. As a result, more research is needed to develop heterogeneous devices that can communicate with one another seamlessly.

The devices in a smart home like sensors, actuators etc. are low on resources like computation, memory, bandwidth and battery power. Additionally, the smart home devices communicate over an unsecured wireless channel. The smart home devices communicate with the home gateway via. a wireless channel. The home gate- way in turn may be connected to the internet. Thus, home gateway here acts

like a bridge between users and smart devices. Thus, the smart home networks are widely used, allowing the users to control their household equipment's using their smart phones, tablets, web apps etc. anywhere and anytime [9][13][17].

### A. Observations

Existing research efforts addresses CPS security related challenges and issues. While the smart home offers convenience and cost savings, there are still challenges. The research work focusing on the challenges related to cyber physical system. Security is a measure concern for current CPS based application [23]. Security risks and bugs continue to plague makers and users of the technology. Adept hackers, for example, can gain access to a smart home's internet-enabled appliances. In October 2016, a botnet called Mirai infiltrated interconnected devices of DVRs, cameras, and routers to bring down a host of major websites through a denial-of-service attack, also known as a DDoS attack. Measures to mitigate the risks of such cyber-attacks include protecting smart appliances and devices with a strong password, using encryption when available, and only connecting trusted devices to one's network.

May require additional work for homeowner to track additional passwords and monitor product security Certain required security mechanisms cannot be equipped with smart device because of space and computation requirements of those algorithms. For example, a smart device may follow the commands provided by its controller without verifying its authenticity. Thus, the resource constrained nature of these smart devices makes it difficult to provide robust security. In the recent era, a lot of work is guided towards smart home security, [13] [4] [6] [16] [22] [11] [8] most of the approaches incurred a high amount of overhead for performing device authentication while concentrating less on other security properties. The research work [19][7][18] provide insights on various security techniques and approaches based on behavior model. As per the studies, some severe threats like eavesdropping are not considered as a part of the threat model. However, in order to secure the smart devices from revealing their private data to the adversaries over an unsecured channel, there is a high requirement for the security mechanisms in smart home devices from the time they are deployed which ensures that the entities involved in the communication are authentic and not fake from the adversaries. Our proposed scheme uses symmetric key cryptography and hash functions for providing robust security in SHS. A proof of concept is provided for ensuring that the security mechanisms are robust against certain popular attacks.

### A. Contributions

This paper makes the following contributions:

1) Study the current research trends in Security for

smart home networks and identify weaknesses in existing solutions.

2) Proposes a novel secure and lightweight session key establishment algorithm.

3) Presents a proof of concept for the solution and compare it with existing solutions.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the related works, Section III illustrates the system design, section IV shows proposed scheme, section V discusses evaluation and section VI concludes the paper.

## SYSTEM DESIGN AND SECURITY PROPERTIES

### A. System Design

We will consider a SHS with N number of heterogeneous smart devices like temperature sensor, smart lights, gateway server etc. The communication in between smart devices and gateway server through CPS application.

Fig. 1. Smart Home System Environment

As shown in Fig.1, resource constrained smart devices (SD) communicate with Gateway Server (GS) over a wireless channel (e.g.,Zigbee, WiFi) [21] [3] [5]. The GS communicates with the resource constrained smart devices and controls them by providing instruction wirelessly. The SDs capture data through the connected sensors and sends the data wirelessly to Gateway Server where the data is analyzed and instructions to be per- formed are provided.

Fig.1 shows three main entities of SHS, given as follows:

1) SD sends home data to GS through the wireless link.

2) GS controls and manages all SDs. GS is incorporated with two interfaces:

i. One for communicating with SDs,

ii. Other is connected to the outside world through  internet for providing data to the home users [20].

3) Security Server to generate and assign keys to the entities of smart home system.

*B. Security Properties*

Some works [17] [12] have identified several security properties for consideration in SHS from beginning. They are listed and explained as follows:

1) Mutual authentication: The adversary in smart home may pretend to be a legal entity by obtaining sensitive data from SD's or GS. Thus, mutual authentication and verification is important for the involved entities, thus prohibiting adversaries or compromised devices form  getting unauthorized network access.

2) Session key establishment: Post verification, entities must agree on a session key to ensure security for inter-entity communication.

3) Message confidentiality: An adversary may eaves- drop, on a wireless channel, on the information transmitted between entities. Protocols are vulnerable to information leakage attacks. A basic approach here is protecting entity's data to maintain message confidentiality.

4) Message integrity: Message integrity ensures that messages sent be the sending entity is received by the receiving entity without modifications.

5) Lightweight-ness: Security protocols become an overhead for applications, thus we require lightweight session key establishment and authentication mechanism specially for resource con- strained SDs.

6) Safeguarding to well-known attacks: Proposed security scheme should be preventive to various popular and well-known attacks like masquerade, message forgery, known key, message replay and denial-of-service.

## IV. PROPOSED SCHEME

For providing an adequate amount of security in SHS, this section proposes a scheme which fulfils the requirements for all security properties illustrated in Subsection III-B. Before participation, the smart devices require authentication in SHS. Our scheme can be applied in many different CPS applications, e.g., appliance control system, light system, climate control system, home care, etc. Table I shows the symbols used and our assumptions are as follows:

1) The Security Server (SS) and Gateway Server (GS) are connected and are secure entities of our system.

GS is tampered proof and is capable of protecting  private data.

2) The symmetric key and hashing algorithms in GS and SDs are identical.

Our proposed scheme includes two phases:

1) System Initialization Phase.

2) Authentication and Session Key Establishment  Phase.

A. System Initialization

Initially, all the system entities have to register themselves with the Security Server (SS) through an offline process and obtain security parameters. Before the deployment of devices in the network, for every smart device (SD) A, the SS generates and assigns a unique encryption key ($EK_A$), a unique authentication key ($AK_A$) and a unique gateway identifier ($GI_A$). Along with this, $EK_A$, $AK_A$, $GI_A$ is also stored in GS. SS is responsible for maintaining all the databases. For security purposes, all the security keys are assigned a lifetime, which totally depends in the SS.

B. Authentication and Session Key Establishment Phase

For maintaining the initial trust among SDs, we present an authentication and key establishment mechanism, which is presented in four steps as follows:

**Step1: Performed by Smart Device A.**

1) Generate random nonce s and store it.

2) Generate random number r1.

3) Calculate authentication token,

$AT_A = h (GI_A \| AK_A \| r1)$.

4) Calculate session token,

$ST_A = E_A (AK_A, s, r1)$ encrypting using key $EK_A$.

5) Calculate $tag1_A = HMAC (AT_A, GI_A \| s)$.

6) Send $tag1_A$, $ST_A$ to $SD_A$.

**Step2: Performed by Gateway Server for SD A.**

1) Receive {$tag1_A$, $ST_A$} from $SD_A$.

2) Decrypt session token, $ST_A$ with key $EK_A$ and extract  {$AT_A$, s, r1}.

3) Check if s exists; if true then exit else store s.

4) Calculate authentication token,

$AT'_A = h (GI_A \| AK_A \| r1)$.

5) Check $AT_A == AT_A$, if true then proceed else exit.

6) Calculate $tag1'_A = HMAC (AT_A, GI_A \| s)$.

7) Check $tag1'_A == tag1_A$; if true then proceed else exit.

8) Generate random number r2.

9) Calculate session key, $SK_A = h (GI_A \| s \| AT_A)$.

10) Calculate $tag2_A = E_A (SK_A, s, r2)$.

11) Send {tag2$_A$, r2} to smart device SD$_A$.

12) Use SK$_A$ as a session key.

**Step3: Performed by Smart Device A.**

1) Receive {tag2$_A$, r2} from GS.

2) Decrypt tag2$_A$ with key KE$_A$ and extract {SK$_A$, s, r2'}.

3) Check if received s == sent s; if true then proceed  else exit.

4) Check r2 == r2'; if true then proceed else exit.

5) Calculate session key, SK'$_A$ = h (GIA ||s || AT$_A$).

6) Check SK'$_A$ == SK$_A$; if true then proceed else exit.

7) Use SK$_A$ as the session key.

## V. EVALUATION

This section shows the evaluation of the proposed scheme using proof-of-concept scenario.

A. **Preposition**: Resilience to masquerade attacks.

**Proof**: Masquerading as a legal entity between the gateway server and the smart device A for joining the smart home network cannot be done.

**Scenario**: Consider an adversary X that captures the request message {tag1$_A$, ST$_A$} sent from SD-A to GS and initiates a masquerading attack to join the GS by sending a fake request {tag1$_X$, ST$_X$} to the GS. Adversary X computes tag1$_X$ = HMAC (AT$_X$, GI$_X$|| s$_X$) and AT$_X$ = h (GI$_X$ || AK$_X$|| r1$_X$).

**Resilience**: The gateway identifier GI$_A$ and authentication key AK$_A$ is hidden; thus, the GS cannot verify fake identity sent by adversary X using AT$_X$ and tag1$_X$. In order to generate the same HMAC, the adversary X need to compute the authentication token (AT$_A$) of device A, but in order to compute AT$_A$, the adversary X requires the real GI$_A$ and AK$_A$ values which are hidden. Hence  adversary X cannot be authenticated at GS due to the use of garbled keys GI$_X$ and AK$_X$ by the adversary X.

*A.* **Preposition:** *Resilience to replay attacks.*

**Proof:** On intercepting the message sent from the smart device to the GS and replaying the message to the GS, the GS rejects the replayed message.

**Scenario**: Consider an adversary X that captures the request message {tag1$_A$, ST$_A$} sent from SD-A to GS and replays the message after certain intervals of time. Resilience: The SD generates the random nonce s and stores it. The generated random nonce s is sent in encrypted format to the GS. GS keeps the copy of the received nonce as described in Step2 of Section IV. Hence, in a replay packet, as the received nonce is already known to the GS, it rejects the replayed message.

## V. CONCLUSION

The security issues, challenges and observations related to CPS system explained by the many researchers It is also worth noting that the elderly population is increasing and adoption of smart home technology for elderly people is a major challenge. It observed that the trend for having smart home environments is almost under its way like connected homes, in-house climate control system, intelligent light systems, security and safety systems.  However, with a lot of good sides to SHE, if the services are exploited by an adversary, then it can cause disasters for the users. Thus, in this paper, we proposed a secure and light session key establishment algorithm considering the resource constrained smart devices for smart home environments. The evaluation of the proposed scheme demonstrated resilience of the proposed scheme against masquerading and replay attacks.

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